Tập trung quyền sở hữu, tính độc lập của ban quản trị và hành vi chấp nhận rủi ro: Bằng chứng tại Việt Nam
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24311/jabes/2017.28.5.924Keywords:
Risk-taking, Corporate governance, Ownership concentration, Board independenceAbstract
This paper aims to investigate the effects of ownership concentration and board independence on risk-taking behavior of Vietnamese listed firms. Using an extensive dataset for the 2008–2015 period and employing specific estimation techniques, the study finds a negative (positive) relation between ownership concentration (board independence) and firm risk-taking. The empirical results verify corporate governance mechanisms (i.e. ownership structure and board composition) as influential sources of the riskiness of corporate decisions in Vietnam.
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