Phân tích lý thuyết trò chơi ba chiều trong quá trình doanh nghiệp xử lý ô nhiễm môi trường
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24311/jabes/2018.29.12.689Keywords:
Environment Pollution, Non-Government Organization, Environment Regulations, A Three Player Game ModelAbstract
This study aims to analyze the determinants and balance the benefits of relationships between government, enterprise, and non-government organization in the treatment of environmental pollution. By using the method of building a game theory pattern, a three-player game model has been employed to analyze the interesting relationships between government, enterprise, and non-government organization. The results suggest that the use of high fines from the government on the enterprises which cause pollution will be more effective than high subsidies. Besides, if the government increases fines and subsidies policy, the enterprises will lessen the positive handling of pollution and regulation under the environmental regulations. The level of environmental supervision from non-government organization will affects the inspection of the government but not directly affected to the enterprise. Therefore, in order to achieve sustainable economic development, it is necessary to develop a mechanism for rewarding, maintaining and supporting the development of non-governmental organizations and encouraging enterprises to create and apply new technologies.
References
Chen, ZH. L., & Wang, W. J. (2017). Evolutionary game analysis of governments and polluting firms considering environmental tax regulation. Management Review, 29(5), 226–236.
Coase, R. (1960). The problem of social cost. Journal of Law and Economics, 3, 1–44.
Coppola Jr, E., & Szidarovszky, F. (2004). Conflict between water supply and environmental health risk: a computational neural network approach. International Game Theory Review, 6(04), 475–492.
Conrad, K. (1993). Taxes and subsidies for pollution-intensive industries as trade policy. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 25(2), 121–135.
Franckx, L. (2005). Environmental enforcement with endogenous ambient onitoring. Environmental and Resource Economics, 30(2), 195–220.
Jørgensen, S., & Zaccour, G. (2001). Incentive equilibrium strategies and welfare allocation in a dynamic game of pollution control. Automatica, 37(1), 29–36.
Liu, S. X., Zhu, Y. M., & Du, K. Q. (2017). Three-player game analysis among enterprise, government and Non-government organization in environmental pollution abatement. Environmental Pollution and Control, 5, 574–577,582.
Liu, Zh. N. (2013). The regulation of environment pollution. China: Chemical Industry Press.
Luo, F. B., Fan, B., & Meng, W. D. (2015). Game analysis of cleaner production in enterprises under environmental regulation. Modern Management Science, 4, 18–20
Pigou, A. C. (1932). The Economics of Welfare (4th ed.). London: Macmillan.
Raquel, S., Ferenc, S., Emery Jr, C., & Abraham, R. (2007). Application of game theory for a groundwater conflict in Mexico. Journal of environmental management, 84(4), 560–571.
Sumaila, U. R., Dinar, A., & Albiac, J. (2009). Game theoretic applications to environmental and natural resource problems. Environment and Development Economics, 14(1), 1–5.
Xi, P. H., Liang, R. B., & Xie, ZH. F. (2017). Tax sharing adjustments, fiscal pressure and industrial pollution. World Economics, 10, 170–173.
Xu, Y. M. (2013). Incomplete information game analysis of pollution supervision for enterprise. Jinan Journal Philosophy and Social Sciences, 5, 49–55.
Zhang, X. G., & Zhong, M. C. (2011). Research about government regulation and the firm environment pollution under the perspective of game theory. China Population, Resources and Environment, 21(2), 31–35.
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2018 JOURNAL OF ASIAN BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC STUDIES
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
